Canadians ought to have a proud history of their Canadian Forces. During the First World War nearly 65,000 men gave their lives for the British Empire fighting in France winning in historical battles such as Ypres and Vimy Ridge. During the Second World War Canadians answered the call once again and fought all over Europe in defence of democracy. Our navy proportionately grew to be one of the largest in the world and we developed a world-class air force. Throughout the modern age Canadians have adopted the sentiment that they are natural peacekeepers. With a diverse culture and history we somehow posses the national ability to act as world mediators – an ability which has given us credit on the world stage. This paper will examine the historic roles of the Canadian Forces in peacekeeping, NATO and the militarization and weaponization of space and will establish a future for the Canadian Forces based on the directions of the past.
It is impossible to write about the Canadian Forces and not discuss peacekeeping. Canada since 1989 had been involved in every single peacekeeping mission and the Canadian public appeared to have supported a Canadian leadership role in peacekeeping around the world . If one were to have asked a Canadian on the street why Canadians were natural peacekeepers chances are they will not have an answer. Regardless of short manpower from the Canadian Forces the Canadian government formulated a policy towards peacekeeping that Canadians had not only a duty to be peacekeepers around the world but also an inherent right to lead the charge . This section on peacekeeping and the future of the Canadian Forces will look at the historical reasons why Canada became a natural peacekeeper, the stresses that this policy put on the Canadian Forces as a whole and its implications for the future of the Canadian Forces and foreign policy.
Modern peacekeeping has traditionally been acknowledged to have been formed by former Prime Minister and noble peace prize winner Lester B. Pearson. During the Suez Crisis in 1956 Pearson suggested that an international contingent be sent to the region to relieve the tensions building after British and French forces occupied the Suez Canal . The 5,000 member strong contingent was the largest peacekeeping force ever risen and was headed by Canadian General E.L.M Burns. The overall mission was a success since the British and French troops were able to withdraw without any conflict breaking out in the region. Since then, the United Nations has authorized 63 peacekeeping missions as of 2005, with the 1990s seeing the largest number of UN sanctioned peacekeeping missions to date . The fact alone that the past decade saw the largest number of peacekeeping missions makes it a modern and relevant aspect of the Canadian Forces and plays a vital role in determining the role and future of the Canadian Forces.
To understand why the Canadian government placed so much emphasis on the Canadian Forces to engage in peacekeeping missions abroad one must gain an understanding of the state of Canadian foreign policy at the height of international peacekeeping. Through its mediation in the United Nations Canada was able to establish itself as a ‘helpful fixer’ and ‘honest broker’ which enabled political leaders “to ‘punch above their weight’ in foreign policy’” Canada was able to secure its position as the natural peacekeeper because of its own diverse culture and history of accommodation . In his book looking back on his own years as Canada’s Prime Minister, Jean Chretien stated that one of the reasons that Canada was to participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia was that it was Canadians duty as world citizens to stop the ethnic cleansing taking place in that region . Peacekeeping provided Canada on the international stage with a specific ability – a job – that gave it credibility in international organizations such as the UN, NATO and the G8. It acted domestically as a means of national unity because of the astonishing amount of support that Canadians had for peacekeeping and for a strong Canadian role in peacekeeping with 69% of Canadians saying that they consider peacekeeping to be “a defining characteristic of Canada” . Peacekeeping also gave Canada a sense of international solidarity as displayed in Chretien’s observation on Canadian involvement in the peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia.
As much as politicians voted in favour of more and more peacekeeping missions for Canada and the Canadian public opinion on peacekeeping remained high it did not change the fact that the Canadian Forces were in fact very stressed under the weight of peacekeeping . Figure 1 shows that as peacekeeping missions grew throughout the early 1990s military spending actually decreased. As the Canadian Forces were being called on by the Canadian people through Parliament year after year during the 1990s budgets slashed funding. During the 1990s Canada had committed to 46 peacekeeping missions in areas such as the Western Sahara, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Afghanistan and Cambodia . As regular force personnel from mainly the army began to become used up the militia was asked more and more to provide personnel and junior officers to join in peacekeeping missions. Reservists began to play a major role in battles such as Medak Pocket where 70% of the Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry Platoon was composed of reservists . Bar far the worst case of military exhaustion due to the overburden of peacekeeping that was placed on the Canadian Forces was displayed in Somalia when the only available unit for the mission, the Canadian Airborne Regiment, on 16 March 1993 tortured and killed a Somali youth while other senior non-commissioned members heard screams and did nothing to help . The causes of this incident have largely been linked to the fact that an undertrained, ill-equipped and poorly assembled Canadian unit was sent into a complex conflict zone in order to appease international relations with the United States . The unit was disbanded after the affair and much of the details of the incident were kept from the Canadian public for a decade in fear of tarnishing Canada’s reputation as a ‘natural peacekeeper’.
There is no doubt that peacekeeping has and can continue to play a vital role in Canadian foreign policy. The arguments mounted against peacekeeping tend to be towards the intensity of the missions during the 1990s and the strains that were placed on an already thin Canadian Forces. If Canada is to continue its role on the international stage as the ‘natural peacekeeper’ than military funding must reflect the duty being asked of her men and women in uniform. More must also be done domestically by the Federal government to ensure clarity in missions with the Canadian public. The incident of Somalia was a tragic example of an overstressed military but was compounded by the fact that the Federal government withheld information in order to protect the ideal that was inherent it its own peacekeeping policy. Peacekeeping has proven to be a vital tool in national unity and does give Canada an international role that allows her to be a larger player at the international table. For that reason peacekeeping must remain an aspect of the Canadian Forces in the future in so long as the Federal government is willing to provide the necessary funding required for training, equipment and manpower.
The act of states forming military alliances is nothing new to humankind. The formation of military alliances can be traced as far back as Ancient Greece when the Greek city-state Athens led the Delian League in the aftermath of the Persian Wars . Since its establishment in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a cause of great controversy and a central theme of Canadian foreign policy . This section of NATO and the future of the Canadian Forces will look at Canada’s role in NATO, the ability of Canada to fight alongside her NATO allies and the role that NATO can play in the future of the Canadian Forces.
The concept of NATO is pretty basic; members agree not to attack any other member of the Alliance and further pledge to offer military support in the event of an attack on any member of the Alliance . Canada was one of the twelve original signatories of The North Atlantic Treaty. Since the end of the Cold War the purpose of NATO has been called into question . Canada’s role in NATO is largely based on her contributions. Under the auspice of the United Nations NATO continues to serve as a vehicle for international peace building and peacemaking under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter . Currently Canada has 2,800 troops in the Southern Afghan Province of Kandahar under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) .
To understand interoperability within NATO one must have an understanding of the sheer differences that exist between members with regards to defence spending. Figure 2 shows Unites States military spending compared to the rest of NATO and the rest of the world. Currently US military spending accounts for nearly half of the total world military expenditure and double the total of her NATO allies. For that reason it is very difficult to compare any one member of NATO to the US in regards to military spending. Currently Canada has a national defense budget of $16.5 billion (CAD) or 1.1% of the GDP. In terms of relevance within NATO Canada ranks 17th in terms of military investment of GDP and 6th in terms of direct investment . Shortfalls within the Canadian Forces’ ability to fight alongside her NATO allies are nothing new. In 1985 the Minister of National Defence under Brian Mulroney, Robert Coates, promised a green paper that would set aside $10 billion to “rectify the equipment shortfalls” . However the pledge never materialized due to the soaring budget deficits (one of the most contemporary examples of divisions between Canada and the rest of NATO was displayed when Canadian troops landed in Afghanistan, with borrowed transports, wearing green Cad-Pad uniforms in a theatre that was anything but green ).
As an original signatory of The North Atlantic Treaty Canada has an obligation to be a leader within the Alliance itself. Currently there is no question that the Alliance is in a tough situation. Not only are Alliance members, especially Canada and many European nations, beginning to fall behind in defense spending and capability but the Alliance as a whole is being called into question in this post-Cold War era. The future of the Canadian Forces must include NATO. However, just as with peacekeeping, Canada’s military spending must be in line with her NATO obligations. Article III of The North Atlantic Treaty states “…the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” . Canada must have the capability to fight militarily within NATO and the capability politically to be able to guide NATO policy so that Canadian interests are heard and met. The current NATO mission in Afghanistan is a clear indication of the state of Canadian interest within NATO especially in regards to the political capital that Canada has with the other members of the Alliance. The purpose of NATO is simply collective security but the carrying out and practice is much more complex and difficult. Interoperability within NATO must remain a key force behind Canadian defence spending.
Since the early days of war great advancements have been made within military technology. Mankind first fought only on land with spears and shields. Soon spears gave way to swords and military units with horses and artillery were formed. We learned to conquer the seas with battleships that opened up the English Empire and led to the discovery of the New World. During World War I the newly developed airplanes were modified to make tight maneuvers and carry weapons to fight other planes with. Today military units are advanced creatures designed to track, fight and defend from enemies. The cliché line from the television Star Trek series calls outer space the “new frontier” and in many ways for North American and European militaries in particular it very much is the new frontier of modern warfare. This section which will look at the militarization of space and the future of the Canadian Forces will draw on historical developments of military space technology, the current position of the Canadian government and the opportunities for future development of space-based weapon systems for the Canadian Forces.
Contrary to popular belief Canada does not have a long history of opposition to the militarization and weaponization of space . In fact following World War II Canada was a leader in space development through the Defense Research Board (DRB) which coordinated all research between the armed services and civilians. Prior to the launch of the Russian Sputnik the vast majority of space-based research was military oriented . In December 1958 the DRB published a study paper titled, “A Paper in Support of Space Science and Space Technology” which advocated the establishment of a national space policy which included the militarization of space . However, before studying the issues of the militarization and weaponization of space one must understand the difference between the two. Militarization is the act of giving a military character to or the act of using something for a specific military purpose . Weaponization is to adapt something for use within war . An example of the militarization of space would be the establishment of a GPS satellite system for uses of navigation onboard a naval vessel. An example of weaponization of space would be the development of a satellite system that is capable of launching a nuclear warhead from space . The Royal Canadian Air Force was the first element of the armed forces to include missile and space technologies as part of its mandate . Up until 1968, development with the United States emerged and it appeared, for the time being, that both Canada and the US would play a significant role in establishing a space based military policy. However, with budget cuts through-out the 1970s and 1980s the development of a space-based program fell by the wayside . Furthermore the creation of a unified Armed Forces which was conducted under the watch of Minister of National Defense Paul Hellyer gave way to confusion over the roles of each element and confusion over what command space development would fall under within this new structure for the Canadian Forces . As Canadian investment in space-based military technologies declined and eventually disappeared the US government continued to develop military uses for space including establishing GPS systems which aided infantry units and observation systems which provided accurate intelligence. In 2002 the US government lobbied the Canadian government to invest in a North American Ballistic Defense System which was designed to stop accident attacks from Chine or Russia or attacks from rogue states such as Iran . Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy and then Prime Minister Jean Chretien led the charge against the development. The legacy was continued by Chretien’s Liberal predecessor Paul Martin Jr. who solidified Canada’s position against the weaponization of space. Currently the development of a Ballistic Defense System is ongoing without Canadian support.
The issue of the militarization and weaponization of space is one that has sparked a heated debated in Canada. While many Canadians oppose the weaponization of space many do not differentiate between the militarization and weaponization. As Canada struggles to maintain its claims to sovereignty in the North it is imperative that we develop space-based military intelligence systems that are able to track violations in the far North. Canada has the largest seaboard of any nation in the world and it is imperative that a domestic defence system integrate the use of naval vessels. For that reason alone development of GPS navigation systems must be established in order to provide our sailors with world-class technology to defend Canada herself in the event of an attack or threat. If Canada is to last as a modern military power than it must begin development of space-based military technology therefore the future of the Canadian Forces must include the development of these technologies and their integration into all aspects of the CF.
The development of a national defence policy is not something that ought to be taken lightly. Canada has a long military history and it is important for any scholar or policy-maker to draw on that history when hypothesizing or formulating military or foreign policy. This paper has outlined three distinct roles that the Canadian Forces has played in the past and the need into the future in order to contribute to a continued total military policy. Just as it is important for any military policy to draw on the past it is equally important that any military structure be able to adapt and change as new enemies rise and fall and new technologies become introduced. If the Canadian Forces are to last in the next century it is vital that policy makers both within the CF and the Department of National Defense remain open to the development of new technology and new strategy. It is also important for law-makers, especially the Prime Minister, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance remain open and aware of the need for military investment today and in the future. If Canada is to continue her role as the ‘natural peacekeeper’, remain a significant and contributable member of NATO and development space-based technologies that will make our men and women in uniform world class fighters, sailors and pilots then Canadians must be willing to invest in our Canadian Forces. No future can exist for the Canadian Forces without the funding for these and many more projects.
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Posted by ejjames 
